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This paper is the ﬁrst of two companion pieces examining competition between
payment systems. Here we develop a model of competing platforms which
generalises that considered by Chakravorti and Roson (2006). In particular,
our model allows for fully endogenous multi-homing on both the merchant
and consumer sides of the market. We develop geometric frameworks for
understanding the aggregate decisions of consumers to hold, and merchants to
accept, different payment instruments, and how these decisions will be inﬂuenced
by the pricing choices of the platforms. We also illustrate a new potential source
of non-uniqueness in the aggregate behaviour of consumers and merchants which
is distinct from the well-known ‘chicken and egg’ phenomenon – and indeed
can only arise in the context of multiple competing platforms. Finally, we brieﬂy
discuss how this new source of non-uniqueness may nevertheless shed light on the
‘chicken and egg’ debate in relation to the development of new payment systems.
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iiCOMPETITION BETWEEN PAYMENT SYSTEMS
George Gardner and Andrew Stone
1. Introduction
Over the past decade, analysis of the pricing strategies of payment system
operators has been an area of growing interest. Much of this analysis has, however,
been conducted in the context of a single payments platform, competing with the
default alternative of cash. Only recently has a literature developed examining the
more complex, but more realistic, situation of competing payment systems.
Important contributions in this latter area include Rochet and Tirole (2005),
Armstrong (2006) and Guthrie and Wright (2007). In these and other papers,
considerable progress has been made in identifying key issues inﬂuencing
platform pricing. However, the complexity of modelling competition between
payment systems has typically required such papers to adopt a range of
simplifying assumptions, some of which limit the applicability of any ﬁndings.
One such assumption is that payment platforms levy purely per-transaction fees
on both consumers and merchants. Adopting this assumption has the analytical
advantage of ensuring that every consumer (merchant) faces the same charge
for each transaction on a given platform as every other consumer (merchant).
However,inmanypaymentsmarketscompetingschemestendtouseannual,rather
than per-transaction, fees in their pricing to consumers.1 In such markets, the
effective per-transaction fee faced by consumers, rather than being identical for
all consumers, varies depending on their propensity to use a given network.
A second assumption commonly adopted relates to the degree to which consumers
(merchants) tend to hold (accept) multiple payment instruments – known as multi-
homing. In recent years the relative tendency of consumers and merchants to
multi-home has emerged as an important potential determinant of platforms’
1 An example is the credit card market in Australia. Of course many credit cardholders in
Australia also receive reward points per dollar spent – equivalent to a negative per-transaction
charge. However, they must usually pay an additional annual fee for membership of a rewards
program.2
allocation of their fees between the two groups. However, allowing for multi-
homing on both sides of payments markets signiﬁcantly complicates analysis of
aggregate consumer and merchant behaviour, and hence of platforms’ pricing
incentives. It has therefore been common – an example is Chakravorti and
Roson (2006), discussed in greater detail below – to assume that multi-homing
is allowed only on one side of the market, with participants on the other side
permitted to subscribe to at most one platform (single-home).
Finally, three further simplifying assumptions often adopted are: that competing
platforms provide identical bundles of payment services to both consumers and
merchants; that they face identical costs in providing these services; and that
consumers or merchants are homogeneous in the values that they place on the
beneﬁts they receive from transacting with each platform. These assumptions
considerably ease the task of understanding the mechanics of competition between
platforms. They also allow consumers or merchants to be treated as identical
in the transactional beneﬁts they receive not only across platforms but across
individuals. This dramatically (albeit unrealistically) simpliﬁes modelling of the
balancing task each platform faces in trying to get ‘both sides on board’, so
as to maximise proﬁt. These assumptions do, however, limit the scope for such
analysis to inform our understanding of competition between, say, different types
of payment instruments, such as debit versus credit cards.
Against this background, the central goal of this paper is to construct a model of
competition between payment systems which relaxes as many as possible of these
assumptions. We would also like the model to be implementable, so as to allow the
use of simulation analysis to study the pricing implications of such competition.
Much of the literature to date on such competition has tended to be purely
analytical – focusing, for example, on deriving the marginal conditions that
will be satisﬁed at a proﬁt-maximising equilibrium (in terms of suitably deﬁned
elasticities of consumer and merchant demand) and how these conditions will be
affected by underlying features of the two sides of the market. Such analysis is
both illuminating and important. However, it can also be valuable at times to be
able to study the full solution to a model of any system. Such global solutions –
in the current setting comprising each platform’s ultimate pricing choices, their
proﬁts, and the ﬁnal take-up of each platform’s services by both consumers and
merchants – can help not only to draw out interesting features of the system3
being modelled, but also illustrate how these features may respond as underlying
parameters of the system are varied.
With these goals in mind, the model we develop is an extension of Chakravorti and
Roson (2006). Their paper considers the case of two payment platforms competing
with each other, along with the default payment option of cash.
A desirable feature of the Chakravorti and Roson (CR) model is that each
platform, while charging merchants on a per-transaction basis, levies a ﬁxed fee
on consumers for joining the platform. Their model thus avoids the ﬁrst (and
arguably most restrictive) of the common limiting assumptions described above. It
also explicitly allows for: heterogeneity among both consumers and merchants in
the values they place on the transactional beneﬁts provided by each platform; and,
in principle at least, variation between the platforms in both the payment services
they provide and the costs they incur in doing so.2
Finally, an additional strength of the CR model is that it incorporates the ‘derived
demand’aspectofpaymentsthatmanygenericmodelsoftwo-sidedmarketsfailto
capture. This is the property that payment transactions occur only as a by-product
of the desire to undertake some other transaction – namely the exchange of a good
or service – rather than being supplied or demanded for their own sake. All of
these features contribute to making Chakravorti and Roson’s framework a good
starting point for modelling competition between payment systems.3
The CR model does, however, assume that while merchants may choose to
accept payments from neither, one or both platforms, consumers may at most
2 In practice, however, it should be noted that for the CR model the analysis of competition in the
case of ‘non-symmetric’ platforms is ‘very complex, and general analytical results cannot be
readily obtained’ (Chakravorti and Roson 2006, p 135). This practical limitation carries over to
the model we develop in this paper.
3 The CR model does not, however, allow for ‘business stealing’ considerations. This is the
phenomenon – analogous to the well-known ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ – whereby each individual
merchant may feel compelled to accept payments from a platform, even if they would prefer
(say) to be paid in cash, for fear that if they do not then some consumers who wish to use that
platform might transfer their business to a competitor. In developing our extension of the CR
model we also do not attempt to allow for business stealing considerations. This is not because
we regard them as unimportant, but simply because analysis of them is not a particular goal
of this paper – and omitting them simpliﬁes the model, without obscuring those aspects of
payments system competition which we do wish to investigate.4
subscribe to one platform. It thus incorporates the second of the common limiting
assumptions listed earlier. The key extension we make is to remove this restriction
on consumers, so as to be able to study the implications of fully endogenous
multi-homing on both sides of the market for the pricing strategies of competing
payment platforms. This turns out to have substantial ramiﬁcations for the
behaviour of both consumers and merchants, and hence for platforms’ pricing
strategies towards each group.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to describing our extension of the CR
model – henceforth referred to as our ECR model (for ‘Extended Chakravorti and
Roson’) – and exploring its implications, in theoretical terms, for the behaviour of
consumers, merchants and platforms. Section 2 of the paper sets out the details
of our ECR model, as well as introducing essential notation. It also discusses
possible applications of the model, including to competition between different
types of payment instruments. Section 3 then focuses on establishing geometric
frameworks for understanding the aggregate decisions of consumers to hold and
merchants to accept the competing payment instruments in the model, and how
these will be inﬂuenced by the pricing choices of the platforms.
In Section 4 we analyse an interesting new potential source of non-uniqueness in
the behaviour of consumers and merchants in our model, and explore its possible
implications for the ‘chicken and egg’ debate in relation to payment systems (and
two-sided markets more generally). Numerical simulation of the model is deferred
to the sequel to this paper, where (inter alia) the results of such simulations are
used to further investigate the likely effects of competition on platforms’ pricing
strategies.4 Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
4 See Gardner and Stone (2009a). After developing our ECR model we became aware that a
somewhat similar study of the impact of allowing endogenous multi-homing on both sides
of the market had already been undertaken in Roson (2005). Indeed, that paper allows, in
principle, for additional features which our ECR model does not, such as multi-part (ﬂat and
per-transaction) pricing by platforms to both sides of the market, as well as both multi-part
costs to platforms and multi-part beneﬁts to consumers and merchants. However, it does not
develop the geometric frameworks for understanding consumers’ and merchants’ card choices
developed here, nor does it appear to explicitly address the non-uniqueness issues, canvassed
in Section 4 of this paper, which can arise in such a model. Our own simulation analysis
also suggests that there may be ‘starting-point dependency’ issues associated with the iterative
approach used there – as described in Footnote 8 of Roson (2005, p 14) – to generate numerical
simulation results.5
2. A Model of Competing Payment Systems
In this section we set out the details of our ECR model of two competing payment
systems. To ﬁx ideas, and to simplify the exposition, we take these to be card
payment networks. However, there is nothing inherently special about cards.
Hence, the analysis which follows applies just as well in principle to non-card
payment systems.
2.1 The General Model
The model contains three types of agents: a set of C consumers, denoted W
c, a set
of M merchants, denoted W
m, and the operators of two card payment platforms, i
and j. The platforms offer card payment services to consumers and merchants, in
competition with the baseline payment option of cash. We focus primarily on the
case where the two platforms are rivals. However, for comparison purposes, we
also consider the case where both platforms are operated by a monopoly provider
of card payment services.
Every consumer is assumed to make precisely one transaction with each merchant,
using either cash or one of the platforms’ cards. By ﬁxing the number of
transactions at each merchant, independent of the pricing decisions of the
platforms, this assumption is consistent with the ‘derived demand’ aspect of
payments discussed earlier. However, as noted, it also explicitly rules out ‘business
stealing’ considerations from the model (see Footnote 3).
For a transaction to be made using a particular payment type, two conditions
must be satisﬁed. First, both the consumer and merchant must have access to that
instrument; for example, for a transaction to occur on platform i the consumer
must hold a card from platform i and the merchant must accept platform i’s cards.
All consumers and merchants are assumed to hold/accept cash, so cash is always
a payment option.
Second, the decision must be made to select that payment method in preference to
all other feasible options. Consistent with most treatments of payment systems,
this choice at the moment of sale is assumed to fall to the consumer. Each
consumer makes this choice to maximise the net beneﬁt he or she will accrue
in making that particular payment transaction.6
For simplicity, both consumers and merchants are assumed to receive zero utility
if cash is used to make a payment. By contrast, as discussed further below, all
consumers are assumed to receive non-negative utility from paying by card – so
that consumers who hold either platform’s card will always prefer to pay by card
rather than by cash, if possible.
We now describe the incentives facing: platforms in their choice of pricing
strategies; merchants in their decisions whether or not to accept the cards of each
platform; and consumers in their decisions whether or not to hold the cards of
each platform, and to prefer one or the other – if they hold both – when making




i denote the subset of consumers who choose to hold the card of platform i,
and let W
c
i;j denote the further subset of these consumers who choose not to hold




j;i be deﬁned correspondingly, and let W
c
i;j
denote the subset of consumers who choose to hold the cards of both platforms i
and j. Finally, let W
c
0 denote the subset of consumers who choose to hold no cards

























Next, among those consumers holding both cards it will be necessary to
distinguish also between those who would prefer to use card i over card j, in the














5 For simplicity, and without impact on the model, we assume that any consumers who hold both
cards, and who would be indifferent between using the two if a merchant accepted both, are





0 to be the fraction of consumers who choose to hold no cards,



























































analogous subsets of W
m (so, for example, W
m
i;j is the subset of merchants who
choose to accept the cards of platform i but not of platform j).7 Then, as for the






























































For ease of reference, this notation and that introduced in Sections 2.3 to 2.5 below
are summarised in Table 1.







0j=C, where jj is used to denote the size of a set.




i;j;j, since the choice of
payment instrument at the moment of sale is assumed to fall to the consumer, not the merchant.
This makes description of the merchant side somewhat simpler than that of the consumer side.8
Table 1: List of Model Notation
Variable Description
Consumer market segments (fractions)
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i;j;i) Subset (fraction) of consumers who choose to hold both cards and who
prefer to use card i over card j whenever merchants accept both
Merchant market segments (fractions)
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i Flat fee charged to consumers to subscribe to card i
f
c;
i The ﬂat fee f
c












i The ﬂat fee f
c
i converted to per-transaction terms for a consumer in W
c
i;j;j







i Per-transaction fee charged to merchants by platform i
Platform costs
ci Cost incurred by platform i for each transaction processed over the platform
gi Flat cost to platform i of signing up each consumer
g

i The quantity gi=MD
m
i (representing the ﬂat cost gi converted to






C (M) Total number of consumers (merchants)
ti Maximum per-transaction beneﬁt received by any consumer on platform i
mi Maximum per-transaction beneﬁt received by any merchant on platform i
h
c
i Per-transaction beneﬁt received by a given consumer on platform i
h
m
i Per-transaction beneﬁt received by a given merchant on platform i
Pi Total proﬁt earned by platform i
Notes: For simplicity, where there is analogous notation for both platforms only that for platform i is shown.
Consumer (merchant) market fractions represent the proportion of all consumers (merchants) that are
members of the corresponding set.9
2.3 Platforms
The two platforms are assumed to be proﬁt-maximising and to face per-transaction
costs of ci for platform i and cj for platform j. In addition, they incur ﬁxed costs
gi and gj respectively for each consumer that they sign up.





each consumer, but do not levy per-transaction fees on consumers (nor do they
offer per-transaction rewards). Conversely, platforms do not impose ﬂat, up-front








i and cost gi, while each transaction generates revenue of f
m
i
from the relevant merchant and incurs a processing cost of ci; and similarly for
platform j.
For each platform, proﬁts will be determined by both the number of consumers
whom they manage to attract and the volume of transactions subsequently
undertaken on the platform. When in competition with one another each platform
must, in making its pricing decisions, take into account the expected effects
of any fee increases on both consumers and merchants. These effects include
causing some consumers (merchants) to abandon the platform in favour of holding
(accepting) only cash or the card of the other platform – either as a direct result
of the fee impact, or indirectly by reducing the number of merchants prepared to
accept the card (consumers wishing to use the card).








































The three right-hand-side terms in the top equality of Equation (11) are,
respectively: proﬁts from subscriptions; proﬁts from transactions made by
cardholders who either only hold card i, or hold both and prefer it over card j;
and proﬁts from transactions made by cardholders who prefer card j over card i
but hold both.10







































































Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below describe, in greater detail, geometric frameworks
for understanding the incentives facing proﬁt-maximising platforms in their fee
choices, in terms of the impact of these fee choices on consumers’ and merchants’
card holding and acceptance decisions.8
2.4 Consumers
Consumers make their payment choices so as to maximise their utility. They
are assumed to receive a per-transaction beneﬁt for paying by non-cash means,
equal to h
c
i for payments made over network i and h
c
j for payments made over
network j. Consumers are heterogeneous in their beneﬁts, which are randomly
(though not necessarily independently) drawn from distributions over the intervals
[0;ti] for platform i and [0;tj] for platform j.9
In Chakravorti and Roson (2006), and in the sequel to this paper (Gardner and
Stone 2009a), these distributions are taken to be uniform, as this represents
an interesting case and one which signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes analysis of the
model. Consumers’ draws of beneﬁts for each platform are also assumed to be
independent – so that the beneﬁt any individual consumer receives from making
a payment over network i is unrelated to the beneﬁt they receive from making a
8 The implications of these incentives for platforms’ pricing are then explored in Appendix B.




jg thus typically differ from consumer to consumer but, for each
consumer, are the same for every transaction.11
payment over network j. While it may help the reader to adopt these assumptions
mentally in what follows, it is important to note that they are not necessary for the
model and, other than in Section 4, we do not require them for the remainder of
this paper. Indeed, at the end of Section 2.6 we brieﬂy describe a natural setting in
whichanalternativejointdistributionalassumptionforconsumers’per-transaction
beneﬁts might be appropriate.
As noted above, a consumer making a payment over network i or j faces no per-
transaction fee. Since each consumer’s per-transaction beneﬁt from using either
platform is always non-negative, consumers who hold cards will therefore always
prefer to pay by card rather than by cash, whenever this is possible. Unlike in
Chakravorti and Roson (2006), it is assumed that each consumer can choose to
hold no cards, one card or both cards; and, in the event that they sign up to both
platforms, can choose to use card i in preference to card j, or vice versa, where a
merchant accepts both.
In assessing their expected utility, each consumer is assumed to have a good
understanding of the fraction of merchants who will sign up to each platform,








j g. The equations which describe the




jg will obtain from each of
their possible card holding/use options are thus as follows:
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the utility the consumer would receive, respectively, from choosing to hold neither





i;j;j denote the utility the consumer would receive from
choosing to hold both platforms’ cards and then choosing, respectively, to use
card i over card j, or vice versa, whenever a merchant accepts both.12
Finally, before turning to the merchant side, it is useful to compute what the
effective charge is, in per-transaction terms, for different consumers who elect
to hold each platform’s card. Focusing without loss of generality on the cards of
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i will expect to make only
MD
m
i;j transactions on their platform i card, since they will use it only when a
merchant accepts card i and does not accept their preferred card j. Hence, these
consumers face a higher effective per-transaction charge for payments on their














Similarly, consumers in the subset W
c
i;j;i face a corresponding effective per-
transaction cost for payments on their platform j card of f
c;


















play an important role in the geometric framework described in Section 3.2 for
understanding consumers’ card holding decisions.
2.5 Merchants
Each merchant can choose to sign up to both networks, one network, or neither
network, based on the net beneﬁt it will receive from doing so. Like consumers,
merchants are assumed to receive a per-transaction beneﬁt for accepting non-
cash payments, equal to h
m
i for those received on network i and h
m
j for those
received on network j. Merchants are also heterogeneous in their beneﬁts, which
arerandomly(butnotnecessarilyindependently)drawnfromsuitabledistributions
over the intervals [0;mi] and [0;mj] for platforms i and j.10 If a merchant accepts a
payment over network i it is charged a per-transaction fee of f
m
i , and similarly for
10 As on the consumer side, to ﬁx ideas it may help to focus on the case of uniform and
independent distributions throughout the remainder of this paper. Nevertheless, it should again
be noted that there is no reason in principle why non-uniform and/or correlated distributions
could not be used here.13
platform j. However, merchants do not face any ﬁxed costs in choosing to accept
either platform’s cards.
In assessing the beneﬁt it will receive from signing up to one or more platforms,
each merchant is once again assumed to have a good knowledge of both: the









j g; and the fractions of those choosing to hold both cards who
will then prefer to use a particular card at the moment of sale. Given this, the































































i;j denote the net beneﬁt the
merchant would receive, respectively, from choosing to accept neither platform’s
cards, the card of platform i only, the card of platform j only, or those of both
platforms. Note that these equations also rest upon the feature of the model,
discussed earlier, that consumers will always prefer to pay by one or other card
rather than by cash, if possible.
2.6 Possible Applications of the Model
Having speciﬁed our ECR model, the next step is to derive descriptions of the
aggregate card holding and acceptance behaviour of consumers and merchants in
it. Before doing so, however, it is worth brieﬂy addressing the question: to what
real-world situations might the model potentially apply?
Since platforms in the model interact directly with participants on both sides of the
market, the obvious application is to competition between rival three-party card
schemes, such as American Express and Diners Club. The absence of separate
issuers and acquirers in the model makes it appropriate to such a setting.
Despite the absence of distinct issuers and acquirers (and consequent lack of
explicit interchange fees), the model could arguably still be used to shed light14
on some features of competition between four-party credit card schemes (such as
MasterCard and Visa). While clearly less well adapted to this situation, the model
nevertheless accurately captures many features of the dynamics of the consumer
and merchant sides of the market which would arise in this setting. It might also
offer some insights into competing four-party platforms’ likely pricing behaviour,
with the tilting of platforms’ price structures in favour of consumers or merchants
potentially indicative of their likely interchange fee choices in this setting.
That said, caution would need to be exercised before using our ECR model to draw
any ﬁrm conclusions about the case of competition between four-party schemes.
For example, in the event that the issuing side were dominated by a small number
of large institutions, the model’s applicability to this case would be limited, given
itslackofapropertreatmentofoligopsonyeffects(inrelationtoplatforms’pricing
behaviour towards such issuers).11
Our ECR model potentially also allows us to draw some inferences about the case
ofcompetitionbetweendifferenttypesofpaymentinstrument,suchasdebitversus
credit cards (or cheques versus either of these). Chakravorti and Roson (2006)
emphasised the scope for their model to be used to study such competition –
stressing, in this regard, its capacity to handle situations where platforms provide
different maximum per-transaction beneﬁts to consumers and/or merchants (so
ti 6= tj and/or mi 6= mj).
Our ECR model also offers scope for such differentiation between platforms
based on the maximum per-transaction beneﬁts they provide. However, this is not
something which we pursue in the simulation analysis in the sequel to this paper.
Rather, there is a more fundamental reason why we believe that our ECR model,
like Chakravorti and Roson’s earlier one, plausibly covers the case of competition
between different types of instrument – namely, that it allows for heterogeneous
beneﬁts, to both consumers and merchants, across the two competing platforms.
11 Another important distinction in the case of competing four-party credit card schemes would
be that annual credit card fees are paid by consumers to issuers, rather than to the schemes. We
might expect this distinction to have implications for the transferability of any model results
regarding how the use of ﬂat fees to consumers, rather than per-transaction fees, would affect
platforms’ pricing. The importance of this distinction in practice, however, would depend on
the extent to which schemes might be able to extract some or all of these ﬂat consumer fees
from issuers – say through the use of scheme fees to issuers based on subscriber numbers.15
Even where consumers’ (merchants’) beneﬁts from transacting on each platform
are uniformly distributed, as long as they are not perfectly correlated then some
consumers (merchants) will value using platform i more highly than platform j,
and vice versa. This is consistent with the fact that in the real world different
agents will, for example, place different intrinsic values on using debit and credit
cards. Some consumers, for instance, may be particularly averse to taking on debt,
and so appreciate the budgeting discipline provided by a debit card. Others, by
contrast, may value the ﬂexibility afforded by a credit card relative to a debit card
in managing intra-month cash ﬂow constraints.
Finally, by allowing for non-uniform and/or correlated distributions of consumer
andmerchantper-transactionbeneﬁtsacrossplatforms,ourECRmodelpotentially
even applies to the case of competition between a premium credit or charge card
brand and a non-premium one. To the extent that some consumers might value
the prestige associated with holding a certain ‘exclusive’ payment card, this could
generate an incentive for one platform to target this market segment – hoping to
charge higher fees to cardholders and, if possible, to merchants compared to a
rival platform focused instead on increasing proﬁt by maximising its subscriber
numbers and transaction volumes. The attraction of such a targeted business
approach would be greater, the stronger the concentration of consumers placing
an asymmetrically high prestige value on transacting with a premium rather than
run-of-the-mill payment instrument. This is something which our ECR model
could, in principle, incorporate via using a suitable non-uniform distribution for
consumers’ per-transaction beneﬁts.12
3. Understanding Merchants’ and Consumers’ Card Choices
Having described the general model, the next step is to try to understand what
fractions of merchants and consumers will choose to sign up to none, one or
both platforms, and what factors will inﬂuence these proportions. In Section 3.1
we ﬁrst describe a geometric framework for thinking about merchants’ card
acceptance decisions, and for understanding how these decisions will be affected
by platforms’ pricing strategies. The more complex geometric framework for
12 In this way our ECR model might represent an appropriate vehicle for investigating both the
presence of premium credit cards in the marketplace alongside more prevalent ordinary credit
cards, and the market dynamics of competition between the two.16
understanding the analogous decisions on the consumer side is then set out in
Section 3.2.13 Details of the derivations of the geometric frameworks described
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are provided in Appendix A. Finally, in Section 3.3 we
show how these frameworks simplify to the versions derived and analysed in
Chakravorti and Roson (2006), for the special case considered there.
3.1 Merchants’ Card Acceptance Decisions




j g for accepting
a payment on platform i or j. It is possible therefore to represent each merchant




j -space, with the population of all merchants, W
m, then being
distributed across the rectangle bounded by the points (0;0), (mi;0), (0;mj) and
(mi;mj).14 Recall here that mi and mj denote the maximum per-transaction beneﬁts
which any merchant will receive from processing a payment on network i or j
respectively.
Using Equations (21) to (24), it is then possible to subdivide this rectangle into









i;j (see Appendix A for details). Doing so yields that W
m may be conveniently
represented geometrically as shown in Figure 1.15
The fact that Line 1 of Figure 1 may be non-horizontal reﬂects that there may
be some merchants who will choose not to accept platform j’s cards, despite
the per-transaction beneﬁt they receive from taking a payment on platform j,
h
m
j , exceeding the per-transaction charge they would face for doing so. This is
13 Having established frameworks for understanding agents’ behaviour in aggregate on both the
merchant and consumer sides, these frameworks are then used in Appendix B to discuss, from
a theoretical perspective, the incentives facing platforms in their pricing choices.
14 In the event that merchants’ draws of per-transaction beneﬁts are from uniform and independent
distributions thenthe population ofmerchants will (onaverage) be evenlydistributed across this
rectangle, with concentration M=mimj.
15 Without loss of generality, Figure 1 has been drawn with f
m
i < mi and f
m
j < mj. This reﬂects
that if either platform were to set its per-transaction fees above these levels it would attract no
merchants to accept its cards and so would make no proﬁt.17
the phenomenon known as ‘steering’ – discussed, for example, in Rochet and
Tirole (2003).16
For these merchants, although the net beneﬁt they would receive from processing




j , is positive, the net beneﬁt they would receive




i , is greater again. If the
difference between these net beneﬁts is sufﬁciently large then, provided enough
consumers who hold card j also hold card i, it may be worthwhile not to accept
platform j’s cards. This would see some payments shift to cash (namely, those
by consumers in W
c
j;i), at some loss to the merchant. However, it would also
steer those consumers holding both cards to pay using the cards of the merchant’s
preferred platform, platform i – generating a gain sufﬁcient, for some merchants,
to justify declining the cards of platform j.
16 The fact that Line 2 may also be non-vertical reﬂects corresponding steering of consumers by
some merchants from platform i to platform j. Note that here we use the term ‘steering’ in
the sense in which it is generally used in the theoretical literature on payment systems; that
is, the refusal by a merchant to accept a platform’s card, so as to force those consumers who
multi-home to use a different card preferred by the merchant. This is in contrast to the colloquial
senseinwhichthetermissometimesused,ofamerchanttryingtoinﬂuenceconsumers’choices
through milder means such as signs or verbal suggestions about preferred payment options.18
Figure 1: A Geometric Representation of the Population of Merchants






















































































3.2 Consumers’ Card Choices





jg for making a payment on platform i or j. Hence, we
may also represent the population of all consumers, W
c, as being distributed across19




j-space, bounded by the points (0;0), (ti;0), (0;tj)
and (ti;tj).17
Using Equations (15) to (19), this rectangle can be subdivided into mutually











i;j;j (see Appendix A for the details). Doing so yields that the population of all




j-space as shown in Figures 2
and 3. The added twist here, unlike on the merchant side, is that the breakdown
of W




j . Hence, our
representation of W
c consists of two separate diagrams, with Figure 2 depicting




j and Figure 3 the situation if the reverse inequality



































Regarding the intuition for the subdivisions shown in Figures 2 and 3, the
boundaries of the region W
c





j (see Section 2.3). For consumers in this region, the ﬁxed
cost of holding either card exceeds the total beneﬁt they would accrue from
that card, even if they used it at every merchant that would accept it. Then









represents the boundary between those consumers not in W
c
0 who would opt to
hold card i, if they could hold only one platform’s card, and those who would opt
to hold card j.





consumers who choose to hold both platforms’ cards. Focusing without loss of
generality on the Region W
c
i;j;i in Figure 2, this consists of those consumers for
17 Recall here that ti and tj represent the maximum per-transaction beneﬁts which any consumer
will receive from making a payment on network i or j respectively, as set out in Section 2.4.





j, are from uniform and independent distributions then the population of all consumers
will (on average) be evenly distributed across this rectangle, with concentrationC=titj.20
Figure 2: A Geometric Representation of the Population of Consumers








































































































i ) and has
slope 1.21
Figure 3: A Geometric Representation of the Population of Consumers








































































































j ) and has
slope 1.22



























The intuition underlying Inequality (26) is obvious. Since consumers face no per-
transaction fees, this simply represents the division between those consumers who,
if they hold both cards, would prefer to use card i, and those who would prefer to
use card j.
The interpretation of Inequality (27) is also straightforward. Recall that, by
deﬁnition, f
c;
j is the (relatively high) effective per-transaction price that a
consumer who holds both cards, but who would prefer to use card i over
card j, faces for card j transactions. Hence, Inequality (27) is simply capturing
that a consumer who would prefer to use card i over card j will only wish to hold
both cards, rather than just card i, if the per-transaction beneﬁt they would receive
from using card j exceeds this price.
The interpretation of Inequality (28), however, is more interesting. This condition
captures that, even for a consumer who would prefer to use card i over
card j, it may be that he or she would still choose to sign up to platform j
ahead of platform i (if, say, far more merchants will accept platform j’s cards than
platform i’s). Hence, to wish to hold both platforms’ cards, it is also necessary that
the additional utility for such a consumer from signing up to platform i, if already
holding platform j’s card, should exceed the cost of doing so; otherwise such a
consumer would be better off holding only the card of platform j. This translates














where: the ﬁrst term on the left-hand side equates to the extra utility a consumer
would obtain from being able to pay by card, rather than by cash, at those
merchants which accept card i but not card j; and the second term corresponds




j would gain from23
being able to switch his or her card payments from platform j to platform i, at
those merchants which accept both cards. This condition is then easily conﬁrmed
to be equivalent to Inequality (28) above.18
A further complication on the consumer side
Finally, the need to allow for two possible cases rather than one is, unfortunately,
not the only added complication with the geometric framework described above
for the consumer side, relative to the merchant side. A further one relates to the
magnitudes of ti and tj.





j tj. This reﬂects that, if either platform were to set its fees so that one or
other of these inequalities failed, then that platform would attract no consumers,
and hence would make no proﬁt.









j g, there is nothing which ensures
that proﬁt-maximising platforms will necessarily set their fees so that this will
be so. Hence, for example, Figure 2 ought really to allow for the possibility that
f
c;








i  ti; and also independently for the
possibility that f
c;








i  tj (and similarly
for Figure 3). Figures 2 and 3 really, therefore, each break into nine sub-cases,





j g have been shown.
These additional possibilities do not fundamentally alter the structure of Figures 2
and 3, since they essentially just alter where the lines h
c
i = ti and h
c
j = tj sit
in relation to the other parts of each diagram. However, they do signiﬁcantly







18 An alternative derivation of Inequality (28), working directly from the utility formulae given by





i;j;j – even in the special case where consumers’ per-transaction
beneﬁts are drawn from uniform and independent distributions.19
3.3 The Case of the Chakravorti and Roson Model
As noted in Section 1, our model is a generalisation of that introduced by
Chakravorti and Roson (2006). In their model, the restriction is imposed that
consumers may only subscribe to at most one card platform. With this restriction,
the geometric frameworks just derived turn out to simplify dramatically.




i;j;j = 0 it is easily
checked that Lines 1 and 2 in Figure 1 become (respectively) horizontal and
vertical. Hence, Figure 1 simpliﬁes to the situation where a merchant will choose




i , and (independently) will




j . This is consistent with the fact
that, when consumers hold the card of at most one platform, merchants have no
scope to ‘steer’ consumers in their choice of payment card at the moment of sale,
in the manner discussed in Section 3.1.
Similarly, on the consumer side, when consumers are prohibited by ﬁat from





vanish. Hence, Figures 2 and 3 reduce to the single, far simpler representation
given by Figure 4 below.20 Note that this dramatic simpliﬁcation already hints
at how far-reaching the consequences can be, for the modelling of competition
between payment systems, of a ‘no multi-homing’ assumption on either side of
the market. This is a point to which we return in greater detail in the sequel to this
paper (see Section 2.2 and Appendix B of Gardner and Stone 2009a).
19 Of course, as on the merchant side, for the general situation of non-uniform and/or correlated
distributions these equations will be even more complex, with each possible case involving
the double integral over the relevant area of an appropriate (non-constant) density function.
For the special case where consumers’ and merchants’ per-transaction beneﬁts are drawn from









i;j;j are provided in a separate technical annex: see Gardner and Stone (2009b),
available on request.
20 Figure 4 is the exact analogue of Figure 1 in Chakravorti and Roson (2006), except that
everything in Figure 4 is shown in per-transaction terms. By contrast, in Figure 1 of Chakravorti
andRosonconsumersarerepresentedintermsoftheiraggregatenetpotentialbeneﬁts(summed
across all their transactions) from using the cards of platform i or platform j.25
Figure 4: A Geometric Representation of the Population of Consumers












































































j;i, for the special case where consumers










Finally, one further observation is in order regarding our ECR model and the
CR model. This is that both may actually be viewed as representing special
cases of a still more general model of payment system competition, obtained by
incorporating an additional parameter, k, into our ECR model. This parameter
represents the disutility to a consumer from holding more than one card – say,
due to the cluttering of their wallet, or the hassle of having to check two periodic26
transaction statements rather than one. Formally, its incorporation is accomplished
simply by subtracting k from the right-hand sides of both Equations (18) and (19)
in Section 2.4 (the effects of which would, of course, then ﬂow through to alter the
frameworks set out in Section 3.2).
For this more general model, our ECR model would correspond to the special
case k = 0, while the CR model would correspond to any k value greater than
some threshold, ¯ k, sufﬁcient to deter even the most enthusiastic of consumers
from holding more than one platform’s card. While we do not pursue this idea
further here, we do take it up in a different but closely related context in the sequel
to this paper (see Section 5 of Gardner and Stone 2009a).
4. Potential Non-uniqueness of Market Equilibria
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 appear to provide complete descriptions of the behaviour
of merchants and consumers in our ECR model, for given platform fees. In
principle, this should allow us to analyse from a theoretical perspective the
factors inﬂuencing platforms in their pricing strategies.21 However, before such an
analysis can be undertaken, it turns out that there is a signiﬁcant issue remaining
to be clariﬁed about the geometric frameworks just described.
This issue concerns whether or not, for given fee choices by platforms i and j,
the resulting merchant and consumer market outcomes are necessarily uniquely
determined. Interestingly, the short answer to this – at least for some fee
choices – is no! Moreover, non-uniqueness can arise even for the case where
merchant and consumer per-transaction beneﬁts on each platform are uniformly
and independently distributed, and where the platforms are identical in their fee
choices and the maximum per-transaction beneﬁts they provide to both merchants
and consumers.
For this symmetric case it is possible to establish the existence of such non-
uniqueness, as well as identify its extent and the conditions under which it will
arise, purely analytically.22 However, rather than go into the details here we
content ourselves with providing a concrete illustration. This is given by Figure 5,
21 One such analysis, focusing on the incentives facing a platform contemplating an increase in
its ﬂat fee to consumers, is presented in Appendix B.
22 Details are provided in a separate technical annex: see Gardner and Stone (2009b).27
Figure 5: Non-uniqueness of Merchant and Consumer Market Outcomes









Panel 1: low steering/multi-homing equilibrium
Panel 2: intermediate steering/multi-homing equilibrium




























































































































































Notes: Each panel shows the merchant market outcome for that equilibrium on the left, with
the corresponding consumer market outcome on the right. Each possible equilibrium also
corresponds to a different level of platform proﬁts. For the case gi = gj = 0, ci = cj = 0
and t = m = 1 these proﬁt levels turn out to be: Pi = Pj = 0:101CM in Panel 1;
Pi = Pj = 0:097CM in Panel 2; and Pi = Pj = 0:088CM in Panel 3.28









j = 0:12m. The three panels in the ﬁgure show
the three alternative market equilibria which, it transpires, could arise in this case.
What is the signiﬁcance of this potential non-uniqueness? We offer two sets of
observations. The ﬁrst set relates to the extent and nature of the non-uniqueness,
whereitarises.Thesecondconcernsitsimplicationsforimplementingandsolving
the model numerically, and potentially also for the ‘chicken and egg’ debate about
the development of payment systems (and of two-sided markets more generally).
4.1 The Extent and Nature of Non-uniqueness
The ﬁrst noteworthy feature of the non-uniqueness we observe in our ECR model
is that it is not limited to the existence of two possible market equilibria. As
Figure 5 demonstrates, at least three (and potentially more) admissible equilibria
can arise for some fee choices – even for the case of identical platforms.23
This is of interest in view of the most common intuition for how non-uniqueness
in market outcomes might occur in payment systems. Known colloquially as
the ‘chicken and egg’ effect, it is relevant even in relation to a single payments
platform, not just competing platforms. It posits that feedbacks between the
merchant and consumer sides might make both ‘high take-up’ and ‘low take-
up’ outcomes simultaneously possible, for given platform fees. The former
conﬁguration would result if (say) many merchants judged that accepting a
platform’s cards would be advisable, because of expected high consumer demand.
This would then promote exactly the high demand for the platform’s cards among
consumers that merchants expected, in turn justifying their widespread acceptance











mg, up to six distinct equilibria are potentially feasible. These consist of one CR solution –
by which we mean an equilibrium with no consumers multi-homing – and up to ﬁve others
determined by admissible roots of a quintic polynomial whose coefﬁcients are functions of f
c
and f











mg, we can be even more precise. In this case, although for
many fee settings there will be a unique equilibrium, for others there can be as many as three
distinct equilibria. If (f
c;=t)  (f
m=m) these consist of a CR solution and up to two others
involving some consumer multi-homing, determined by admissible roots of a cubic polynomial




m=m) they consist of up to
three equilibria involving consumer multi-homing, determined by admissible roots of this same
cubic. Full details are provided in Gardner and Stone (2009b).29
of these cards. The latter conﬁguration, also internally consistent, would instead
see few merchants judging it likely to be worthwhile to accept a platform’s cards,
and few consumers choosing to hold these cards, with each side’s decisions
validating the other’s.
In its simplest form, however, this intuition provides a potential rationale for just
two distinct market equilibria – rather than the three or more which can arise in
our model for some fee settings. Moreover, it is not the case, for the equilibria in
our model, that high (low) aggregate card holding by consumers and high (low)
aggregate card acceptance by merchants go together. For example, the equilibrium
in Panel 1 of Figure 5 involves consumers holding an average of 0.99 cards and
merchants accepting an average of 1.76 cards; yet the equilibrium in Panel 3, while
having a higher average rate of consumer card holding of 1.32, has a lower average
rate of merchant card acceptance of 1.49.
The non-uniqueness in our ECR model is clearly, therefore, of a different character
than ‘chicken and egg’ non-uniqueness. Rather, it reﬂects non-uniqueness in the
dimension of merchant steering/consumer multi-homing – with the three panels in
Figure 5 corresponding to low, medium and high rates of steering/multi-homing.
Intuitively, the low steering/multi-homing conﬁguration would result if merchants
generally expected few consumers to hold multiple platforms’ cards. This would
lead few merchants to attempt to steer consumers by refusing acceptance of one
or other platform’s cards, which would then promote exactly the sort of single-
homing behaviour by consumers that merchants initially expected. On the other
hand, for the same platform fees the high steering/multi-homing outcome would
result if merchants instead generally expected most consumers to multi-home.
In this case merchants would be much more inclined to steer consumers by
accepting only their preferred platform’s cards, and this would in turn increase
consumers’propensitytomulti-home,asinitiallyexpected.InthecaseofFigure5,
both outcomes would be internally consistent and could arise – with each side’s
decisions validating those of the other – as indeed could an intermediate outcome
involving a moderate degree of merchant steering coupled with a corresponding
moderate degree of consumer multi-homing.
So far as we know, this form of potential non-uniqueness in market equilibria, for
given platform fees, is new and has not previously been concretely illustrated in
the literature. Unlike the ‘chicken and egg’ effect, it is relevant only in the context30
of competing platforms (even where these are symmetric) and cannot arise in a
single-platform setting.24 Its occurrence here illustrates the richness and subtlety
of the feedbacks between merchants and consumers in our ECR model.
4.2 The Modelling and Other Implications of Non-uniqueness
The second observation about the potential non-uniqueness in our model is a
practical one, namely that it raises the question: for both the monopoly and
duopoly settings, to which equilibrium will the market actually settle, where more
than one is feasible? Identiﬁcation of this ‘actual equilibrium’ for every possible
set of fee choices is necessary to complete the speciﬁcation of the model.
The natural decision rule we adopt to resolve any non-uniqueness, at least for the
symmetric case, is based on platform proﬁts. Where several potential equilibria
are possible for given platform fees, each will correspond to a different proﬁt
for each platform. In the case where these proﬁts are symmetric across the two
platforms, we assume that it is the common, high-proﬁt equilibrium at which the
model settles – consistent with platforms having a proﬁt maximisation objective.25
This might occur, say, through both platforms providing temporary incentives to
24 Indeed, the only other paper of which we are aware that discusses non-uniqueness of merchant
and consumer market outcomes at any length, other than in the ‘chicken and egg’ sense, is
Armstrong and Wright (2007). They consider a model in which various assumptions ensure that
agents on one side will all single-home, regardless of the pricing they face. They then ﬁnd that
four different, internally consistent, market equilibria can potentially arise for given platform
prices (although at most, three can ever be feasible simultaneously). No market outcome is
possible, however, in which some but not all agents on one side multi-home. This accounts for
whyArmstrongandWright’sframeworkdoesnotgeneratethesortofnon-uniquenessidentiﬁed
above for our ECR model (corresponding to different gradations of aggregate consumer multi-
homing/merchant steering).
25 In the case of Figure 5, for example, this is the ‘low steering/multi-homing’ equilibrium shown
in Panel 1 of the ﬁgure.31
consumers and/or merchants to drive the market to this outcome.26 (The non-
symmetric case is obviously more complex and is not dealt with in this paper.27,28)
The idea that temporary incentives might be useful to resolve non-uniqueness of
merchant and consumer market outcomes may also be relevant to the ‘chicken and
egg’ debate in relation to payment systems. The problem of how to get consumers
to take up a payment instrument that merchants do not yet widely accept, and vice-
versa, is often raised as a key impediment to the development of new payment
mechanisms. This has then been used to justify the imposition of interchange fees
– or, more generally, pricing skewed in favour of one side of the market – to
encourage one side to come on board, thereby promoting take-up by the other side
and so overcoming the ‘chicken and egg’ problem.29
In its pure form, however, this ‘chicken and egg’ problem is a product entirely
of network effect feedbacks between the two sides of the market – exactly as
with the non-uniqueness described in Section 4.1. Hence, just as here, if a high
take-up equilibrium were deemed preferable to a low one this might justify the
temporary use of incentives, such as interchange fees, to shift the market to this
equilibrium. However, there would be no need on ‘network effect’ grounds for
26 Such incentives would not necessarily require collusion between platforms – something which
would be inconsistent with competition in the duopoly setting – since both platforms’ interests
are aligned in the symmetric case.
27 Since platforms in this situation might order feasible equilibria differently by proﬁt, some
mechanism would be required to determine which potentially second-best outcome for both
platforms would actually be arrived at in this case. One possibility would be a game-theoretic
procedure that would sit within the broader competitive game facing each platform of choosing
its fees so as to maximise its proﬁts, while taking into account how the other platform might
respond. For the general non-symmetric case we do not pursue this ‘game within a game’ issue
further here.
28 For the special non-symmetric case of small perturbations away from a symmetric fee setting
we adopt a different approach altogether, in the sequel to this paper (Gardner and Stone 2009a),
to resolving any potential non-uniqueness. In such cases we assume that the actual market
equilibrium will be the one reached by starting from the symmetric equilibrium and then
iteratively adjusting the merchant and consumer sides of the market, in turn, in the manner
described in Appendix B of this paper, until these cease changing. This sort of iterative
procedure is actually the same as that used in Roson (2005) to carry out simulation analyses –
although we use it only for the case of inﬁnitesimal perturbations from a symmetric solution.
29 We leave aside here the issue of whether growth of a new payment mechanism need always be
welfare-improving.32
such incentives to be maintained, once this equilibrium had been achieved; the
positive externalities to each side from high take-up on the other would provide
sufﬁcient motivation for both consumers and merchants to remain at such an
equilibrium. Hence, the case for continuing interchange fees would have to rest
on the existence of ongoing usage externalities in the system, generated each time
a transaction occurred, as distinct from the sort of ‘usage option’ or membership
externalities just discussed.30
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a model of competition between payment
platforms which avoids many of the limiting assumptions commonly made
in analyses of such competition to date. Speciﬁcally, our model allows for
heterogeneity in consumer and merchant beneﬁts from the use of platforms,
ﬂat rather than per-transaction pricing by platforms to consumers, and fully
endogenous choices by both consumers and merchants about how many cards
to hold/accept.31 These features have a number of potentially far-reaching
consequences. In particular, they allow for different consumers to face different
effective per-transaction prices for the use of a given platform’s card – something
which is not the case when platforms’ pricing to both sides is purely per-
transaction, or when (as in the CR model) consumers are prohibited by ﬁat from
multi-homing. This represents a fundamental change – and one that better matches
reality in a number of settings of interest, such as the case of competing credit card
schemes.
In developing our ECR model we have also shown how the card subscription
decisions of consumers and card acceptance decisions of merchants may be
represented geometrically. This yields frameworks which allow us to more readily
examine and understand the behaviour of, and incentives facing, merchants,
consumers and platforms. We have also used the model to concretely illustrate
a new potential source of non-uniqueness in consumer and merchant market
outcomes, for given platform fees, which is distinct from the usual ‘chicken
30 For a more detailed discussion of membership versus usage externalities in payment systems
(and two-sided markets more generally) see Rochet and Tirole (2005).
31 It also incorporates the ‘derived demand’ aspect of payments markets (although it does not
allow for business stealing considerations).33
and egg’ phenomenon. Unlike the latter, which may arise even for a single-
payment system, this source of potential non-uniqueness relates to the extent of
consumer multi-homing/merchant steering, and so can only occur in the context
of competing payment systems.
In the sequel to this paper (Gardner and Stone 2009a) we use the model developed
heretoexploremorefully,viasimulationanalysis,thelikelyeffectsofcompetition
onplatforms’pricingstrategies.Inparticular,weinvestigatehowtheseeffectsmay
be inﬂuenced by allowing fully endogenous multi-homing by both consumers and
merchants, rather than having only one side of the market allowed to hold/accept
multiple cards.34
Appendix A: Derivation of the Geometric Frameworks in
Section 3
In this Appendix we formally derive the geometric frameworks described in
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 for understanding the card holding, use and acceptance
decisions of consumers and merchants in our model.
A.1 The Framework for Merchants’ Card Choices
We begin by deriving the subdivision – shown in Figure 1 – of the population of
all merchants, W









Clearly, a merchant will lie in W
m



























Next, among those merchants not in W
m
0 , a given merchant will give preference





j;i.33 Hence, by Equations (22) and (23), they will prefer to sign up

















while they will prefer to sign up to platform j over platform i if and only if the
reverse inequality holds.
Lastly, we wish to identify those merchants that will choose to accept the cards of
both platforms; that is, which lie in W
m
i;j. To do this observe that a merchant not in
W
m







































32 Here, and in what follows, we assume without loss of generality that D
c
i > 0 and D
c
j > 0, since
otherwise one or other platform would be attracting no consumers, and so making no proﬁt.
33 Here, the terminology ‘preferred’ platform means that platform whose cards the merchant




































































i;j;j). Similarly Inequality (A4) will




































Inequalities (A1), (A2), (A5) and (A6) then immediately yield the breakdown of
W
m shown in Figure 1.
A.2 The Framework for Consumers’ Card Choices
We now derive the corresponding but more complex subdivision – shown in
Figures 2 and 3 – of the population of all consumers, W





































Next, among those consumers not in W
c
0 (that is, who will hold at least one card),





j;i. Hence, by Equations (16) and (17), they will prefer to sign up to

















while they will prefer to sign up to platform j over platform i if and only if the
reverse inequality holds.
Note that the issue of which platform a consumer would prefer to subscribe to is
distinct from the question of which platform’s card they would prefer to use, at the
moment of sale, if they held both. This latter preference will depend only on the




j, with a given consumer preferring to use platform






Inequality (A8) may be thought of as dividing the region W
cnW
c
0 into two parts,









j . Inequality (A9) represents a different
subdivision of W




i (Line 3 in




j-space and has slope 1.
Finally, we want to identify those consumers who will choose to hold the
cards of both platforms – further subdivided into those who will prefer to use
card i, W
c
i;j;i, and those who will prefer to use card j, W
c
i;j;j. Starting with W
c
i;j;i,
by deﬁnition a consumer in W
cnW
c











j;ig. Hence, by Equations (16) to (18), such a consumer
will lie in W
c




















































j is as deﬁned in Section 2.4; while the second, after some
















A consumer not in W
c
0 will therefore lie in W
c
i;j;i if and only if Inequalities (A9),

















latter constraint, Inequality (A13), does become redundant in specifying W
c
i;j;i, as
illustrated in Figure 3.
As for W
c
i;j;j, a consumer not in W
c




























34 Note that the line corresponding to equality in Inequality (A13) passes through the point
(f
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Appendix B: Platforms’ Pricing Incentives
In this Appendix we use the geometric frameworks developed in Section 3 to
brieﬂy examine, at a theoretical level, the incentives facing platforms in their
pricing decisions. Further details of the analysis sketched here are provided in
Gardner and Stone (2009b), while actual simulation analysis of these incentives
and their implications is carried out in Gardner and Stone (2009a). Note that,
for the purposes of the discussion below, we assume for simplicity that no non-
uniqueness issues arise, along the lines described in Section 4, for any of the fee
settings under consideration.
B.1 The Effects of an Increase in a Platform’s Consumer Fee
Consider the case of a platform contemplating raising its ﬂat fee to consumers.35
Before doing so it must take into account that, even with unchanged merchant
acceptance, this might cause some consumers to switch to the rival platform, and
cause others to abandon cards altogether in favour of cash. These would be the
direct effects of such a fee increase.
However, they are not the only effects such a change would have on the platform’s
position in the market. The reduction in consumers subscribing would, in turn,
reduce the number of merchants wishing to sign up to the platform. This would
then not only further affect the platform’s expected proﬁt but also generate third-
round effects back on the consumer side (by further reducing the incentive for
consumers to hold the platform’s card), and so on.
The frameworks developed in Section 3 give a way of tracing through these
effects, conveniently broken into direct, second-, third- and later-round impacts
as just described.36 For the case of a marginal increase in platform i’s ﬂat fee to
consumers, with the other platform’s fees held ﬁxed, the ﬁrst few rounds of these
impacts are illustrated in Figures B1 to B3. In these ﬁgures we assume that the fee




j <minfti;tjg, so that the
consumer side of the market may initially be represented as in Figure 3.
35 Thecorrespondinganalysisofthealternativecaseofamerchantfeeincreaseproceedssimilarly.
36 These do not, of course, literally represent ﬁrst-round, second-round and so forth effects in a
dynamic sense. Rather, they represent a useful way of disaggregating the overall shift between
pre- and post-change equilibria into manageable components.39
Figure B1: The Effects of an Increase in f
c
i


























































































Solid lines indicate the initial subdivision. Dotted lines indicate the new subdivision which
would result from a small increase by platform i in its ﬂat fee to consumers from f
c
i to ˜ f
c
i ,
assuming no change in merchant acceptance of each platforms’ cards.
Clearly, we could also, in principle, continue such diagrammatic analysis to
consider fourth-round effects on merchants from the third-round changes in
consumers’ card holding decisions, ﬁfth-round effects on consumers from these
fourth-round impacts, and so on. However, rather than doing so we content
ourselves with two observations.40
Figure B2: The Effects of an Increase in f
c
i
Second-round effects on the merchant side


































































i;j. Solid lines denote the initial
subdivision. Dotted lines indicate the new subdivision which would result from merchants
taking into account, in their card acceptance decisions, the direct effects on consumers’
card choices of an increase by platform i in its ﬂat fee from f
c
i to ˜ f
c
i , as shown in Figure B1.
The ﬁrst is that we would expect any fourth- (or sixth-, eighth-, etc) round effects
to resemble, in general terms, the second-round effects discussed above – being
driven as they would be by shifts in consumers’ card holding choices. Similarly,
we would expect any ﬁfth-, seventh-, etc round effects to resemble the third-round
effects discussed above (rather than the direct effects), being the result not directly
of a price change but indirectly of changes in merchants’ card acceptance patterns.41
Figure B3: The Effects of an Increase in f
c
i




























































































































Solid lines indicate the initial subdivision. Dotted lines indicate the subdivision which
would result from only the direct effects of a small increase by platform i in its ﬂat fee to
consumers from f
c
i to ˜ f
c
i . Finally, dashed lines indicate the subdivision which would result
from taking into account not only these direct effects, but also their immediate impact on
merchants’ acceptance of each platforms’ cards, as shown in Figure B2.
The second observation is that, while not guaranteed, one might hope that iterative
breakdowns like this would see the bulk of any impacts concentrated in the ﬁrst
few rounds, with later-round effects becoming less and less signiﬁcant. Happily,
numerical checks for a range of scenarios suggest that this is typically so – at least42
where, as assumed here, no issues of non-uniqueness arise. Hence, examining up
to third-round effects generally seems to be sufﬁcient, in such circumstances, to
understand how a given fee change by one platform would be expected, ceteris
paribus, to affect the card holding and acceptance decisions of both consumers
and merchants.
B.2 The Impact on a Platform’s Proﬁts and Incentives
For any starting conﬁguration of fees, the sort of analysis in Section B.1 would
alloweachplatformtoassesstheimpactonitsequilibriumconsumerandmerchant
base of a shift in its pricing – at least for unchanged fees on the rival platform.
This would, in turn, allow each platform to determine the effects on its (and its
competitor’s) proﬁts of such a shift, and so weigh its incentives to proceed.37
These latter effects are traced through in detail in Gardner and Stone (2009b),
where a discussion is also provided of how the proﬁt impacts and incentives
would change in the event that the two platforms were not rivals, but rather were
operated by a monopoly provider of card payment services. Without repeating
that discussion here, an illustration of these effects is provided by Table B1, which
summarises these proﬁt impacts for the case of the third-round effects of a small
increase in platform i’s ﬂat fee to consumers (as depicted in Figure B3).
Six distinct effects on consumers’ card holding behaviour may be identiﬁed in
Figure B3 and, for each category, its proﬁt impact may be separated into two
parts: that from resultant changes in net subscription revenue, shown in Part A
of Table B1; and that from resultant changes in transaction volumes, shown in
Part B.38
As is evident from the table, for just two of the six categories of changes are
the proﬁt impacts identical in the duopoly and monopoly cases. The ﬁrst is those
consumers who would switch from holding only card i to holding no cards; and
37 A further – and quite separate – complication for a platform contemplating altering its fees is,
of course, the issue of how the other platform might respond to any such price change.









cj) > 0, or in other words that neither platform is initially subsidising subscriptions or
transactions (even though either possibility could conceivably be a proﬁtable strategy). This
is done for simplicity, to rule out the possibility that a loss of subscriptions or transactions by a
platform could, at least in its immediate impact, be proﬁt increasing.43
Table B1: Proﬁt Impacts of the Third-round Effects on Consumers’ Card
Choices Shown in Figure B3
Positive (+), negative ( ), nil () or ambiguous (?)
The case of a ﬂat fee increase by platform i
Change in card choice Consumers Impact on Pi Impact on monopoly
affected in duopoly proﬁt (Pi+Pj)
A. Impact on net subscription revenue
Hold i only ! No cards Region ˜ A ˆ R ˆ B ˆ A    
Hold i only ! Hold j only Region ˆ R ˜ B ˜ E ˆ Q ˆ E ˆ B   ?
Hold i only ! Hold i and j
Prefer to use i Region KLˆ L ˆ K  +
Prefer to use j Region ˆ E ˆ QK ˆ K  +
Hold i and j but prefer j
! Hold j only Region ˜ E ˜ N ˆ N ˆ Q    
No cards ! Hold j only Region S ˜ B ˆ Rˆ S  +
B. Impact on net transaction revenue
Hold i only ! No cards Region ˜ A ˆ R ˆ B ˆ A    
Hold i only ! Hold j only Region ˆ R ˜ B ˜ E ˆ Q ˆ E ˆ B   ?
Hold i only ! Hold i and j
Prefer to use i Region KLˆ L ˆ K  +
Prefer to use j Region ˆ E ˆ QK ˆ K   ?
Hold i and j but prefer j
! Hold j only Region ˜ E ˜ N ˆ N ˆ Q    
No cards ! Hold j only Region S ˜ B ˆ Rˆ S  +
Notes: For each category of change in consumers’ card holding choices, the table separates the impacts of such
changes into two parts: Part A shows the impact on proﬁt from resultant changes in net subscription
revenue; Part B shows the impact on proﬁt from resultant changes in transaction volumes. Results shown













j  cj) > 0,
as discussed in Footnote 38.
the second is those consumers who multi-home, and who prefer to use card j, who
would switch to single-homing on platform j.
For all other categories the proﬁt impacts would differ between the two cases –
being always, in aggregate, less adverse for the monopolist. For example, consider
the category of consumers who would switch from holding just card i to holding
both cards, but with a preference to use card j. For this category, the impact on
platform i’s proﬁt in the duopoly setting would be nil in terms of net subscription
revenue, but clearly negative in terms of net transaction revenue (since these
consumers would now switch all their transactions at those merchants who accept44
both cards from card i to card j). By contrast, for a monopoly operator of both
platforms, the impact on net subscription revenue would be clearly positive – from
the additional subscriptions on platform j – while the effect on net transaction
revenue would be ambiguous rather then deﬁnitely negative.39
39 Speciﬁcally, in the monopoly case each transaction switched from platform i to platform j
would entail a loss in net transaction revenue of f
m
i  ci, as in the duopoly case, but also
an offsetting gain of f
m
j  cj. Hence, provided f
m
j  cj as we are assuming here, the impact
from these switched transactions would be unequivocally less bad for a monopolist than for the
operator of platform i in a duopoly. Indeed, it might even be positive, in the event that platform
j’s proﬁt margin on transactions, f
m
j  cj, were greater than that of platform i.45
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